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1    The scope of mo-
dernisation is  
a controversial issue 
inside Russia. Most 
statements from go-
vernment represen-
tatives indicate that 
it is being restricted 
to economic trans-
formation, including 
attracting foreign 
investments and 
modernisation of the 
economy. The term 
‘modernisation’ has 
been used within 
this scope of me-
aning in this text.
2    For the speeches 
see:  
http://www.kremlin.
ru/news/5413,  
http://www.kremlin.
ru/transcripts/5979,  
http://www.kremlin.
ru/transcripts/8325
Foreign policy at the service of modernisation: 
old wine in a new wineskin
Marcin Kaczmarski
Russia’s contacts with the external world over the past year have been 
characterised by a gradual improvement in its relations with the West, 
as well as the use of non-confrontational rhetoric, the most far-reaching 
example of which was the address President Dmitri Medvedev gave to 
Russian ambassadors this July. In an attempt to harmonise foreign policy 
with the widely propagated programme for the modernisation of Russia1 
President Medvedev presented a vision of the Russian Federation as a 
responsible global power which is open to co-operation. According to this 
vision, Russian foreign policy would help to attract foreign investments and 
technologies. The West was presented as a partner, not a rival. 
Both this rhetoric and the atmosphere of co-operation in relations with the USA 
and the EU contrast with the assertive and aggressive Russian policy which 
was symbolised by and culminated in the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008.
The changes observed in Russian foreign policy are quite limited, and 
are not constructing a new external strategy. Those changes are rather 
an attempt to find more efficient ways to implement old strategic goals. 
The new image of a responsible global power is inconsistent, and Russian 
policy is still assertive and geopolitically motivated. Although a new 
rhetoric is really in place, the Russian political elite’s perception of their 
country’s place and role in the contemporary international order remains un-
changed. Moscow’s readiness to become engaged in genuine co-operation 
with the West has not increased significantly; it is still to a great extent 
declarative in nature. 
Medvedev’s rhetoric
While promoting the concept of Russia’s modernisation, President Dmitri Medvedev pre-
sented a new vision for Russian foreign policy. Its general outline appeared in Medvedev’s 
manifesto entitled ‘Russia, forward’ and published in September 2009, his speech to the Fe-
deral Assembly in November 2009, and his address to Russian ambassadors in July 20102. 
President Medvedev’s theses were reinforced in May 2010 by a controlled leak of a govern-
mental document formulating a new programme for Russian foreign policy in complian-
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ce with presidential guidelines3. President Medvedev has also made efforts to promote 
the ‘modernisation’ aspects of foreign policy during his foreign visits. 
The new vision can be characterised most briefly as a shift from a confrontational to 
a co-operative approach. In Medvedev’s opinion, Russia should no longer base its policy 
on “nostalgia, stereotypes, complexes, boastfulness and taking offences” and put an end 
to “sulking, confrontation and self-isolation.” The primary goal of foreign policy should be 
to create favourable conditions for modernisation, the measure of success being foreign 
investments and technologies attracted to Russia. External activity cannot be restricted 
to politics alone, but must  to an increasing extent involve economic aspects. 
Referring to Russia’s place and role on the international stage, President Medvedev de-
scribed a vision of his country as a key great power whose global status would be built 
on a broad platform (and not solely on oil & gas and nuclear weapons, as before). Russia 
should become one of the leaders of a multipolar world, a nation which protects its ba-
lance and prevents unilateralism, collaborates in dealing with common challenges, has 
an appropriate say in economic issues, 
and contributes to the resolution of glo-
bal problems. Russia is additionally aided 
in this by the emerging multipolar order 
and the gradual decrease in the number 
of external threats. At the same time, 
Dmitri Medvedev sees Russia as a country which needs to co-operate with foreign part-
ners to be able to put its modernisation programme into effect. 
The Russian president has strongly emphasised his country’s readiness to co-operate with 
the West on the Iranian crisis (his rhetoric has become similar to that of the West; for exam-
ple, he pointed out in July 2010 that Iran was coming ever closer to potential being able 
to produce nuclear weapons) and climate change (leaning towards the EU’s stance).
What has (really) happened?
Since Dmitri Medvedev announced the programme for the modernisation of Russia, the 
atmosphere in Russia’s relations with the West (the USA, the EU, NATO and the Council 
of Europe) has improved significantly, and real changes have taken place in the case 
of several existing points of disagreement. 
In relations with the USA, the predominant issue was the ‘reset’, Washington’s proposal 
to improve bilateral relations. A new START treaty was signed in April 2010 (although the 
key dispute over the location of missile defence systems has not been resolved)4. Russia 
supported the imposition of sanctions on Iran in June 20105. The FBI’s detention of ten 
people on charges of spying for Russia was hushed up, and the agents were exchanged 
for Russian dissidents sentenced for spying for the West. In August 2010, the USA and 
Russia carried out their first joint air defence exercises. At the same time, it needs to be 
noted that the improvement in Russian-US relations is quite limited, and many disputes 
have simply not been mentioned6.
The concept of the Partnership for Modernisation, which emerged for the first time at the 
Stockholm summit in November 2009, has become a declarative expression of change 
in relations with the European Union. However, although a declaration launching that 
programme was adopted at a meeting in Rostov-on-Don in late May/early June 2010, 
it is lacking in content. At the same time, political contacts – both bi- and multilateral – 
3 http://www.runewsweek.ru/
country/34166//
 
 
 
 
4 For more information see  
Marcin Kaczmarski, Nowy  
traktat o kontroli zbrojeń sukce-
sem Rosji, [‘A new arms control 
treaty, a Russian success’] 
Tydzień na Wschodzie,  
nr 14 (132), 14.04.2010.
5 For Russia’s approach to the 
Iranian issue in the context  
of relations with the USA, see 
Marcin Kaczmarski, ‘Russia 
plays the Iran card with the 
USA’, Eastweek, No. 19 (212), 
26 May 2010.
6 See Marcin Kaczmarski, 
‘Russia–USA: limited change’, 
Eastweek, No. 23 (216),  
30 June 2010.
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abound with assurances of developing relations, although without being supported by any 
kind of concrete co-operation. 
Another sign of change in Russian foreign policy is the improvement in relations with 
Norway and Poland, with which Russia has been in dispute over numerous issues. In the 
case of Norway, a statement on the division of the disputed maritime areas in the Barents 
Sea and the Arctic Ocean was made in April 2010. Although the accord has not taken 
the form of a border treaty as yet, the general resolution of the decades-long dispute has 
had a positive effect on Russia;s image. In the case of Poland, the improvement concerns 
both the climate of mutual relations and historical disputes (primarily the approach to the 
Katyn issue). 
Russia’s contacts with NATO have also improved. The political dialogue was activated 
(officially resumed in June 2009), and military contacts were restarted in January 2010 
(after having been suspended since the Russian-Georgian war). Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 
the new NATO secretary-general, has indicated improving relations with Moscow as one 
of his priorities. At the same time, despite promised co-operation in such areas as com-
bating maritime piracy and the conflict in Afghanistan, no concrete joint actions have been 
taken as yet. 
The atmosphere has also changed for the better in relations with the Council of Europe. 
In February 2010, Russia ratified the 14th additional protocol to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which it had withheld since 
2006, thus enabling the reform of the European Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, 
in June 2010, for the first time, the Russian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe supported a resolution which was moderately critical about the 
situation in the North Caucasus.
Russian historical policy has also been strongly revised, as since autumn 2009 it has 
become less confrontational towards the interpretations adopted by Eastern and Western 
European countries, and definitely less apologetic about Stalin. The evaluation of the Soviet 
heritage has become more nuanced, and stronger emphasis has been made on promoting 
the positive role played by the USSR during World War II7.
The external causes – geopolitical changes 
While analysing the external sources of change in Russian foreign policy, it is worth highligh-
ting several major factors, namely the reduction of geopolitical pressure on Russia from the 
West, the global economic crisis and the emergence of a multipolar international order. 
The consequences of the war with Georgia in 2008, which was a culmination of the 
Kremlin’s assertive policy, proved to be beneficial from the Russian point of view. 
The Western countries not only refrained from imposing sanctions or taking any other con-
frontational stance8, but also revised their evaluation of Russia, acknowledging the need 
to respect its interests in the post-Soviet area. In effect, dialogue with Russia was swiftly 
resumed, and Western activity in the post-Soviet area was scaled down. This reduction 
of geopolitical pressure was duly noted by Moscow; signs of this change included the 
effective suspension of plans to enlarge NATO with CIS countries, and the recognition 
of Russia’s special role in this region by implication, all of which made the Kremlin feel 
more secure. In turn, the EU’s initiatives, such as the Eastern Partnership, are seen 
by Moscow as being harmless at the present stage. The alleviation of perceived pressure 
on Russia was also noted in the strategic balance field; the USA withdrew from its plan 
to push through the deployment of elements of the missile defence system in Poland 
and the Czech Republic in September 2009 (the new project is clearly less ambitious, 
7 For more information see 
Jadwiga Rogoża, Marcin 
Kaczmarski, ‘The evolution 
of Russia’s historical policy’, 
Eastweek, No. 17 (210),  
12 May 2010.
8 Only symbolic gestures 
was made: the suspension 
of contacts as part of the 
NATO-Russia Council and 
the freezing of talks on the 
new EU-Russia agreement 
(so-called PCA 2), which were 
to be resumed as early as 
November 2008 anyway.
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and it has not yet been decided whether it will be implemented at all). Washington has 
strongly tempered its criticism of Russian authoritarianism, and Dmitri Medvedev’s mo-
dernisation plans are widely supported by Western leaders. Furthermore, changes have 
taken place inside the CIS which are seen by Moscow as beneficial for Russia. Those 
changes include the takeover of power by Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine and the ensuing 
Russian-Ukrainian rapprochement, and the change of government in Kyrgyzstan (the over-
throw of Kurmanbek Bakiev’s regime, which Russia had recently criticised). As a result 
of those factors, there are no tense con-
flict situations between Russia and the 
West at the present time. 
The global economic crisis has impaired 
the Western countries’ position and incre-
ased their readiness to compromise with 
emerging powers as regards reform of glo-
bal institutions. Given such a multipolar 
international order, Russia is trying to maintain its independent global role and is not intere-
sted in a long-term confrontation with the West, as this would curtail its ability to conduct 
its multidimensional policy. 
In addition to changes in systems, Russian policy is certainly affected by the desire to sup-
port the policy currently adopted by the Obama administration, which Moscow perceives 
as favourable to its interests.
Internal reasons – Medvedev’s game or the elite’s consensus? 
The majority of the Russian political elite are aware of the Russian need for foreign inve-
stments, including technologies, the principal source of which are still Western countries. 
Even in the field of military modernisation, Russia is forced to search for technologies abro-
ad; hence the attempts to obtain a Mistral-class ship or unmanned aerial vehicles. Although 
the government has managed to survive the hardest phase of the economic crisis, various 
defects of the Russian economic model have been revealed as a result of the crisis. 
The recent change in foreign policy is being promoted primarily by President Medvedev, but 
it enjoys wide support among the elite, proof of which is that it has raised no open protests 
or serious disputes. At most, we may distinguish three issues which have revealed diffe-
rences of opinions regarding the tactics to be adopted: the reaction to the US shield (both 
in the context of START negotiations and later), support for the imposition of US sanctions 
on Iran, and accession to the WTO. However, with the exception of the WTO issue (which 
has been raising controversies since the middle of this decade at the least), none of those 
matters concerned strategic decisions.
On the one hand, the vision Medvedev has proposed is an element of domestic policy; 
the slogan of internal modernisation must be supplemented with an external aspect. 
On the other, both the changes observed so far and Medvedev’s rhetoric have not impaired 
the interests of any elements of the coalition which makes up the core of the present regi-
me in Russia. At the same time, this rhetoric attracts that part of the Russian elite which 
demands closer relations with the West closer to Medvedev. 
What does this mean? The limits of the new policy
The rhetoric Medvedev has used, the actions listed above and the special features 
of Russian policy have all led to the signs from Moscow being understood as declarations 
of a durable and strategic alliance between Russia and the West. Therefore, it is reasonable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The consequences of the war with 
Georgia in 2008, which was a cul-
mination of the Kremlin’s assertive 
policy, proved to be beneficial from 
the Russian point of view.
i s s u e  3 9  |  3 1 . 0 8 . 2 0 1 0  |  c e N T R e  f O R  e A s T e R N  s T u d i e s
cOMMeNTARyOsw
OSW.WAW.PL 5
to ask what the recently observed changes stand for, to what extent Russia is becoming 
more open to co-operation with the West, and to what degree Moscow’s approach to the 
wider world can change.
The vision presented by President Medvedev can be seen as an appeal to the Russian 
elite to focus on the main goal, the modernisation of the state, and to refrain from 
building an image of the country as an aggressive power. Medvedev’s project seems 
to recall the approach pursued by China since the mid-1990s, making great efforts 
to assure the external world of the country’s positive intentions. 
This gives rise to the question as to whether Russia also wants to ensure an internatio-
nal environment favourable for its internal changes and to build an image of a responsi-
ble, constructive power. Until the war with Georgia, and even later, despite assurances 
from Moscow, this image was based on an assertive and often confrontational policy, 
examples of which were the strategic bomber patrols, emphasising territorial claims 
in the Arctic, raising the armament levels, and demonstrations of force and independen-
ce. Furthermore, other crises and the disturbed international environment have added 
to the significance of Russia. In this context, the actions taken by Moscow over the past 
year have revealed both the limited na-
ture of the changes and an internal in-
consistency in the new image.
The achievement in relations with the 
USA are rather unconvincing proof of 
the new quality in Russian politics. 
Moscow has long insisted on signing 
a START treaty; now a timid proposal for a new treaty to regulate missile defence 
issues is emerging. Russia’s support for the imposition of new sanctions on Iran in June 
2010 also made it easier for China to do the same, while Iran had previously rejected 
a proposal to enter a deal which would have offered Russia a privileged position. Never-
theless, Moscow is still taking care to ensure that the sanctions do not affect its existing 
co-operation with Iran (especially in the energy sector). Moscow has also opposed the 
imposition of additional sanctions on Iran by the EU and the USA (other than those 
agreed as part of the ‘Six’ and the UN Security Council). 
Russian rhetoric is inconsistent; some official documents (for example, the military do-
ctrine published in February 2010, which was signed by President Medvedev after his 
first modernisation promises) are no different from their predecessors as regards the 
vision of threats surrounding Russia, and their wording is clearly anti-Western. 
Some actions Moscow has taken contradict Russia’s image as a responsible power. 
Those include the president’s meeting with the leader of Hamas, recognised as a terro-
rist organisation by the West; a continuous increase in spending on armament, regar-
dless of the economic crisis; Russian objections at the UN Security Council to Western 
proposals for resolutions regarding Sri Lanka and North Korea; Medvedev’s visit to the 
breakaway republic of Abkhazia; and the lack of a consistent policy regarding accession 
to the WTO. There is also no proof that Russia will be significantly more ready to re-
spond to Western appeals (for example,  helicopters for the government forces in Afgha-
nistan have not been provided, and Moscow’s real share in international co-operation 
for preventing global warming is close to a minimum)9. Additionally, the Kremlin is still 
continuing its policy of making gestures to emphasise its independence. 
9 Iwona Wiśniewska, Marcin 
Kaczmarski, ‘Russia’s position 
on the Copenhagen climate 
summit’, Eastweek, No. 42 
(192), 9 December 2009. 
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Conclusions
It is too early to state that this is another (after the one in 2001–2002) “pro-Western turn” 
by Moscow, or that it is consistently building an image of a “responsible, constructive 
power.” The message is still ambiguous and inconsistent, and the rhetoric is still followed 
by actions which contradict it. Moscow’s goals (in both global and regional terms) and 
the Russian political elite’s perception of the international environment have not changed, 
nor has there been any change in the 
Kremlin’s readiness to respect Western 
appeals. The change mainly covers 
the wording, and it is too early to state 
that Russian foreign policy has been 
revised to make Russia accept greater 
joint responsibility for global affairs, 
not to mention a strategic alliance 
with the West or any part of it. Proof 
of this is that it is difficult to notice 
a pro-Western turn even in the case of Russia’s accession to the WTO; this would be at the 
most a token of a stronger engagement in the global international community and a sign 
of readiness for self-restraint in foreign policy. Moscow wants to receive concrete benefits 
from Western countries, and hopes that a change of image alone will be enough. 
Moscow’s goals (in both global and 
regional terms) and the Russian political 
elite’s perception of the international 
environment have not changed, nor has 
there been any change in the Kremlin’s 
readiness to respect Western appeals.
